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Non-technical summary: Drawing on a large-scale German Linked Employer-
Employee data set spanning the time period 1995-2008, this paper provides new evi-
dence on the collective bargaining wage premium in western Germany. By using lon-
gitudinal data, we seek to improve on recent evidence which relies on cross-sectional
data. Unlike the previous literature, we assess the extent to which dierences in
wages between workers in covered and uncovered rms result from a non-random
selection of workers and rms upon time-invariant unobservables into the dierent
regimes. The fact that we observe employers changing their contract status over
time provides us with the opportunity to measure the relative wage gains or losses
of workers employed in rms that change their contract status.
Taken together, our analysis of separate transitions suggests that workers in rms
leaving industry-level bargaining may incur wage losses relative to those workers who
are employed by \stable" rms. However, adjusting the estimates for dierential
time trends supports the notion that plants changing from industry-level contracts
to no coverage experience more negative time-specic shocks than stable plants,
thereby conrming the result that there is no \true" wage eect of leaving wage
bargaining.
For rm-level contracts, the analysis of separate transitions shows that joining
rm-level bargaining from no-coverage may be associated with a positive wage pre-
mium, whereas the transitions between rm and industry-level contracts tend to give
rise to negative wage premiums of rm-level contracts. This nding is consistent
with rm-level bargaining being initiated by employers who were formerly covered
by an industry-level contract and argues against the view that unions tend to en-
force such contracts in order to secure above average wage gains in highly successful
rms.
Das Wichtigste in Kurze: Die vorliegende Studie liefert neue Evidenz zu
Lohnpramien der Tarifbindung fur Westdeutschland. Im Gegensatz zur bisherigen
Literatur werden Langsschnittsdaten des LIAB fur den Zeitraum 1995-2008 aus-
genutzt, um zu uberprufen, inwiefern durch Tarifvertrage hervorgerufene Lohndif-
ferenziale eine Selektion von uberdurchschnittlich produktiven Beschaftigten bzw.
von Hochlohn-Unternehmen in die Tarifbindung widerspiegeln. Zur Identikation
des Eekts der Tarifbindung auf das Lohnniveau werden Wechselbetriebe identi-
ziert, die ihren Tarifbindungsstatus uber die Zeit hinweg andern. Durch den
Vergleich von Lohnveranderungen von Beschaftigten in Wechselbetrieben mit de-
nen von Beschaftigten in "stabilen" Betrieben wird zeitkonstanter unbeobachtbarer
Heterogenitat auf Individual- und Betriebsebene Rechnung getragen. Eine mogliche
Verzerrung durch die Korrelation zeitvariierender Schocks mit den Regimewechseln
wird durch Unterschiede im Lohnwachstum zwischen Wechselbetrieben und stabilen
Betrieben in den Perioden vor den Regimewechseln abgeschatzt.
Die Analyse der separaten Ubergange zwischen den einzelnen Regimen zeigt,
dass Beschaftigte in Betrieben, die die Flachentarifbindung verlassen, ein gerin-
geres Lohnwachstum erfahren als Beschaftigte in stabilen Betrieben. Gerade fur
Betriebe, die sich vollstandig der Tarifbindung entziehen, zeigt sich jedoch, dass das
Lohnwachstum im Vergleich zu stabilen Betrieben bereits vor dem Wechsel einem
ungunstigeren Trend unterlag. Die Bereinigung der geschatzten Lohnpramien um
diesen Trendunterschied zeigt schlielich, dass sich insgesamt keine signikanten
Lohneekte mehr nachweisen lassen.
Bei den Ubergangen zu Haustarifvertragen deuten die Ergebnisse fur Beschaftigte
in Betrieben, die vorher keinem Tarifvertrag unterlagen, auf signikante positive
Lohnpramien hin, wahrend ein Wechsel von Flachen- zu Haustarifvertragen mit neg-
ativen Lohnpramien verbunden ist. Diese Ergebnisse bleiben durch die Trendbere-
inigung erhalten. Letzteres Ergebnis deutet daraufhin, dass Wechsel von Flachen-
zu Haustarifvertragen eher durch Arbeitgeber initiiert werden und widerspricht der
ublichen Vorstellung, dass Gewerkschaften in vormals achentarifgebundenen Be-
trieben Haustarifvertrage dazu nutzen, um hohere Lohne durchzusetzen.
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Abstract
Using a large-scale linked-employer-employee data set from western Ger-
many, this paper presents new evidence on the wage premium of collective
bargaining contracts. In contrast to previous studies, we seek to assess the
extent to which dierences in wages between workers in covered and uncovered
rms arise from the non-random selection of workers and rms into collective
bargaining coverage. By measuring the relative wage changes of workers em-
ployed in rms that change contract status, we obtain estimates that depart
considerably from previous results relying on cross-sectional data. Results
from analysing separate transitions show that leaving industry-level contracts
is associated with subsequent wage losses. However, the results from a trend-
adjusted dierence-in-dierence approach indicate that the particularly the
transitions to no-coverage appear to be associated with negative shocks. Over-
all, our ndings provide no evidence of a "true" wage eect of leaving wage
bargaining, once dierences in pre-transition wage growth are accounted for.
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1 Introduction
The question of whether unions are able to drive a wedge between the wages of
comparable workers in the union and non-union sector is of considerable interest to
an understanding of the wage determination process. While the empirical literature
for the U.S. and the U.K. has primarily focused on union membership as a deter-
minant of individual wages (e.g., Farber 1983, Freeman 1984, Card 1996, Lemieux
2000, Andrews et al. 1998, Blanchower and Bryson 2010), in continental Europe it
is rather collective bargaining coverage that matters. The reason is that extension
mechanisms, which are widespread in European economies, can widen the coverage
of collective bargaining agreements irrespective of individual workers' union mem-
bership status. Given the dierences in institutional settings in which bargaining
may take place, a further question that has continued to motivate economic research
is how rm-level contracts compare to industry-level contracts.
There is a large theoretical literature on the link between the bargaining structure
and wages (Calmfors and Drill 1988, Moene et al. 1993), whose predictions have
been tested in a number of cross-country studies (Calmfors and Drill 1988, Soskice
1990, OECD 1997, Calmfors 2001). More recently, with the increasing availability
of linked employer-employee data, the relationship between collective bargaining
coverage and wage outcomes has attracted renewed interest. By providing both in-
formation on wages at the individual level and collective bargaining coverage at the
employers' level, such data permit to exploit intra-national variations in the bar-
gaining structure to assess its impact on the level and structure of wages. Examples
include Hartog et al. (2002) for the Netherlands, Cardoso and Portugal (2005) for
Portugal, Stephan and Gerlach (2005) and Fitzenberger et al. (2008) for Germany
as well as Card and de la Rica (2006) for Spain. While Hartog et al. (2002) fail
to detect any positive eect of bargaining coverage on wages, Stephan and Gerlach
(2005) document sizeable wage premiums ranging between 7 and 11 log points for
industry and rm-level contracts. Fitzenberger et al. (2008) nd that the share of
employees subject to a collective bargaining contract is associated with a positive
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wage mark-up, which is found to be larger under rm-level contracts. In a similar
vein, the evidence by Cardoso and Portugal (2005) and Card and de la Rica (2006)
points to higher wage premiums under rm-level as compared to industry-level con-
tracts.
Our paper presents new evidence on the collective bargaining wage premium,
using a large-scale German linked employer-employee data set. Our analysis of col-
lective bargaining coverage and wages for Germany is motivated by several reasons.
To begin with, and most importantly, previous linked employer-employee data evi-
dence on the collective bargaining eect relies on cross-sectional data and typically
fails to address the selection problem.1 As has already been argued in the litera-
ture on union membership wage eects, selection is likely to be a major issue, if
collective bargaining contracts raise wages above the competitive wage and com-
press the returns to observable attributes. In this case, observed and unobserved
productivity components are likely to be negatively correlated since, e.g., workers
with low observed skills will only be hired if they exhibit high unobserved skills (see
Farber 1983, Card 1996, Lemieux 2000). In order to deal with such a potential
selection bias, the evidence presented in this paper is based on a longitudinal data
set. Hence, unlike the studies cited above, we seek to assess the extent to which
dierences in wages between workers in covered and uncovered rms result from a
non-random selection of workers and rms upon time-invariant unobservables into
the dierent regimes. The fact that we observe employers changing their contract
status over time provides us with the opportunity to measure the relative wage gains
or losses of workers employed in rms that change their contract status. Clearly,
such an identication strategy rules out the endogeneity of a change in contract
status, since establishments changing contract status may experience dierent time-
specic shocks than those that retain their contract status. While we are not able to
deal with this endogeneity problem by exploiting an exogenous variation in contract
status, we shall attempt to assess the severity of this problem. The strategy we
1DiNardo and Lee (2004) address the selectivity issue by using a regression discontinuity design.
However, their analysis is based upon an establishment-level data set.
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pursue here is to analyse transitions between the regimes separately and to adopt
a trend-adjusted dierence-in-dierence estimator which permits us to account for
dierences in time-specic shocks across establishments that change contract status
and those that do not.
Secondly, the German case provides an instructive example for continental Eu-
ropean extension mechanisms. Although negotiated wages strictly speaking only
apply to union members, rms generally extend wage settlements to non-member
employees as well. Moreover, central wage contracts may also apply to non-member
rms if an agreement is declared to be generally binding. As a consequence, despite
declining union membership among employees, which to date has reached a rela-
tively modest level of roughly 20 per cent, collective bargaining coverage is still of
crucial importance to the wage-setting process in Germany. For example, collective
bargaining contracts in 2007 were estimated to cover about 39 per cent of employers
and about 63 per cent of employees in western Germany (Ellguth and Kohaut 2008).
A nal, third, motivation is based on the fact that the institutional environ-
ment in Germany is characterised by the coexistence of dierent bargaining regimes.
Collective bargaining contracts may take the form of either rm-level contracts or
industry-level contracts. Moreover, in recent years wage determination without any
bargaining coverage has become more important. Thus, with the increasing im-
portance of the uncovered sector it is possible to compare wage outcomes under
rm-level and industry-level contracts as well as for workers in covered and uncov-
ered rms.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some in-
stitutional background information on German wage determination. Section 3.1.
sets out the estimation strategy for quantifying the wage premiums under dierent
collective wage contracts. While Section 3.2. provides a description of the data set
used, Section 3.3. presents the estimation results. The nal Section 4 concludes.
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2 Institutional Background
In this section we provide some background on how collective bargaining aects
German wage determination. Within the system of wage bargaining, regional and
industry-wide collective wage agreements (Flachentarifvertrage) rank among the
most important contract type. Such centralised wage contracts are negotiated be-
tween an industry-specic trade union and an employers' association. While being
legally binding on all member rms of the employers' association and on all employ-
ees who are members of the trade union, member rms generally extend the wage
settlement to the non-member labour force as well. The reason is that non-member
employees who would receive a lower wage may be expected to join the union any-
way in order to benet from higher union wages. Moreover, central wage contracts
may also apply to non-member rms and their employees if an agreement is de-
clared to be generally binding by the Federal Ministry of Labour. Finally, there are
voluntary extension mechanisms, i.e. rms without any legally binding agreement
may voluntarily apply a central industry agreement. In general, bargained wages
under industry-level contracts merely represent a lower bound on wages, i.e. rms
are free to pay wages above the negotiated rate. However, in contrast to other Eu-
ropean countries, there is no two-tier system with subsequent rm-level agreements,
since higher wages than those stipulated in the centralised agreement are paid on
a voluntary basis and do not arise from a legally binding supplementary rm-level
contract. Overall, the predominance of industry-level bargaining along with the
synchronisation of dierent collective agreements has led economists to characterise
the German system of wage bargaining as medium-centralised with a high degree of
coordination (Calmfors and Drill 1988, Soskice 1990, OECD 2004).
Even though industry-level bargaining may be still be viewed as the predom-
inant form of wage determination, in recent decades German industrial relations
have witnessed a clear tendency towards alternative forms of wage determination.
Evidence from the IAB-Establishment Panel indicates that the proportion of estab-
lishments with a legally binding industry-wide contract fell economy-wide from 48
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per cent to 36 per cent over the time period 1996 to 2007 in western Germany.2
This phenomenon is largely the result of a considerable drop in rms' membership
in employers' associations.3 Employers leaving their employers' association either
have the option of concluding a rm-specic contract with their respective indus-
try union or becoming uncovered. There is likely to be a certain time lag before
such a change comes into eect, as employers face two legal constraints when chang-
ing contract status: First, according to the German Act on Collective Agreements
(\Tarifvertragsgesetz") employers leaving their employers' association are subject to
a validity time limit according to which the contract terms continue to apply until
the respective contract has expired. Note that this also holds true for leaving rm-
level arrangements. Second, even if a contract has already expired, the law dictates
that employers replace the contract terms by individual contracts or, alternatively,
by a rm-specic contract in order to be able to depart from previous contractual
arrangements. However, at this point it is worth noting that the decision to leave
industry-level bargaining is not necessarily left to the employer's discretion. For
instance, even if a rm prefers to stay uncovered, its union may attempt to enforce
a rm-specic contract. Whether such an attempt succeeds, ultimately depends on
rm-specic union density. The underlying rationale is that the union's ability to
present the employer with a credible threat to strike may be expected to increase
considerably with the proportion of workers who are organised in that union.4 Al-
though the absolute number of rm-specic collective wage agreements has increased
markedly since the beginning of the 1990s, this increase cannot explain the declin-
ing importance of industry-level contracts. Evidence from the IAB-Establishment
Panel indicates that the share of establishments reporting the existence of a rm-
level contract fell from 10 to 3 per cent over the time period 1996 to 2007.5 Thus, the
2Own calculations based on IAB-Establishment Panel.
3For example, the employers' association \Gesamtmetall" reports that the share of employees
at member rms as a percentage of total employment in the metal and electrical industry fell in
western Germany from 72 per cent to 55 per cent over the time period 1991 to 2007 (Gesamtmetall
2012).
4Indirect evidence for this is provided by Fitzenberger et al. (2008). Using a cross-section from
the German Salary and Wage Structure Survey the authors nd the eect of rm-specic collective
bargaining coverage increase with the aggregate propensity of union membership.
5Own calculations based on IAB-Establishment Panel. It should be noted here that part of the
5
decline in industry-level coverage rather resulted in an increasing share of uncovered
establishments. In uncovered rms wage determination may either take the form of
individual wage contracts or of plant-specic agreements (Betriebsvereinbarungen)
between works councils and the management. Even though German legislation pro-
hibits works councils from negotiating about issues that are normally dealt with in
collective agreements, they are widely recognised as playing a crucial role in wage
determination (see e.g., Hassel 1999, Hubler and Jirjahn 2003).
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Estimation Strategy
To quantify the collective bargaining wage premiums, we consider a wage equation
taking the following form:
lnwit = + C  Cjt + F  Fjt +   x0it +   u0i +   z0jt +   q0j + ijt (1)
where the error component may be written as
ijt = i + j + jt + it: (2)
There are i = 1,..., N individuals, and N =
P
Ti total worker-year obser-
vations. As we use matched worker-establishment data, j refers to the establish-
ment that employs individual i at time t; i.e., we strictly speaking have j = j(i; t),
with j = 1; :::; J: The dependent variable, lnwit; is the individual log daily wage.
The explanatory variables of main interest are Cjt and Fjt, which are indicator vari-
ables taking on the value of unity if the establishment that employs individual i at
time t is subject to a centralised industry-level or a rm-level contract, respectively.
x0it represents a vector of time-varying individual covariates with a coecient vec-
tor , while u0i denotes a vector of individual time-constant characteristics with a
coecient vector . Similarly, z0jt and q
0
j represent time-varying and time-constant
decline in rm-level coverage might have been caused by a change in the survey question concerning
rm-level contracts. See also Footnote 23.
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j level covariates with coecient vectors  and : Time dummies are included to
capture common macroeconomic eects. Finally, in eq. (2) the unobserved com-
ponent comprises an individual unobserved eect, i; establishment-specic unob-
served heterogeneity, j; a time-varying plant-specic error term, jt as well as a
time-varying individual component it.
In our estimation strategy, we rst focus on a simple pooled Ordinary Least
Squares (POLS) specication of eq. (1), in which neither i nor j are controlled
for. To control for the unobserved rm heterogeneity j; we then proceed to allow
for establishment xed eects. With establishment-level xed eects, time-constant
establishment variables q0j are eliminated, such that the coecient vector  cannot
be identied. The wage premiums of collective contracts are thus identied from
establishments changing contract status. To assess the extent to which within-
establishment changes of contract status are associated with systematic changes
in workers' unobservable skills, we then turn to a xed-eects specication which
eliminates i as well as j: To remove both i + j; we rst-dierence eq. (1)
within each individual-establishment combination, also referred to as individual-
establishment-'spells' (Andrews et al. 2006). Dening s = i+ j in eq. (1) as the
unobserved spell-level eect for spell s, rst-dierencing of eq. (1) yields:
 lnwit = C Cjt + F Fjt +  x0it +  z0jt +jt +it; (3)
where rst-dierencing within each spell sweeps out s. Thus, the coecients on
Cjt and Fjt will yield a consistent estimator of the wage premiums as long as
Cjt and Fjt are uncorrelated with jt and it. Finally, to assess the impact
of collective bargaining coverage on the overall wage structure, we will also estimate
a fully interacted model, which includes interaction terms of all covariates with
the contract status dummies. The interacted regressors are expressed in terms of
deviations from their sample means, allowing us to interpret the estimated coecient
on industry and rm-level contracts as the wage premium for a worker with the
average characteristics of the full sample. As a result, the interacted specication
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reads as
 lnwit = C Cjt + F Fjt +  x0it +  z0jt +jt +it;
+ C  (Cjt(x0it   x)  Cjt 1(x0it 1   x)) + C Cjt  (u0i   u)
+ C  (Cjt(z0jt   z)  Cjt 1(z0jt 1   z)) + C Cjt  (q0j   q)
+ F  (Fjt(x0it   x)  Fjt 1(x0it 1   x)) + F Fjt  (u0i   u)
+ F  (Fjt(z0jt   z)  Fjt 1(z0jt 1   z)) + F Fjt  (q0j   q) + jt +it: (4)
From eqs. (3) and (4) it becomes clear that spell rst-dierencing eliminates time-
constant individual characteristics u0i as well as time-constant establishment vari-
ables q0j, so that both coecient vectors  and  cannot be identied. Only the
interaction coecients r; r, r = C;F; are identied from variations in contract
status, i.e. unless Cjt 6= 0 and Fjt 6= 0: For this reason, it is common to subsume
observable time-constant and unobservable attributes into one single individual and
establishment eect, i.e. 'i =   ui + i as well as #j =   qj + j.
Eqs. (3) and (4) clarify that identication based upon spell dierencing relies on
the assumption that a change in contract status is uncorrelated with time-specic un-
observables. This assumption rules out that, e.g., establishments changing contract
status are subject to dierent time-specic unobservables than those that retain their
contract status. Clearly, it is easy to imagine situations in which this assumption
will be violated. On the employer's side, for example, leaving collective bargaining
might be systematically correlated with negative developments. On the union's side,
however, enforcing a rm-level contract might be correlated with positive shocks if
unions are more likely to do so in better times and successful rms (DiNardo and
Lee 2004). In such a case, identication of the contract wage premium requires in-
strumental variables that aect contract status but not wages. Unfortunately, it is
hard to think of any variables satisfying these requirements.6 However, we attempt
6A potential source of exogenous variation might stem from extension mechanisms as discussed
in Section 2. However, a problem with such an approach is that the majority of contracts that
are declared to be generally binding concern working-time and holiday regulations. Only a small
minority of extended contracts deal with wage settlements. As the latter do not exhibit sucient
variation across industries and regions, we do not pursue this strategy further.
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to assess the severity and direction of a potential endogeneity bias. To do so, we
separately analyse transitions from one regime to the other and adopt for each time
period a trend-adjusted dierence-in-dierence estimator as discussed in Bell et al.
(1999) and Blundell and Costa Dias (2002). Consider for example establishments
that switch from industry-level bargaining to no-coverage. Moreover, let us dene
individuals experiencing this transition as the program group and those who are
employed in establishments that stay covered as the control group. A dierence-
in-dierence estimator based upon eq. (3) will consistently identify C only, if the
expression
E(jt j Cjt =  1;xit;zjt)  E(jt j Cjt = 0;xit;zjt) (5)
equals zero, since otherwise we have
E( lnwit j Cjt =  1;xit;zjt)  E( lnwit j Cjt = 0;xit;zjt)
=  C +BIAS;
where the BIAS is given by eq. (5).7 If, for example, establishments leaving
industry-level bargaining are suering from more negative time trends than those
that retain their contract status, the term in eq. (5) will be negative, thereby giving
rise to a downward biased estimate of  C . To adjust the estimator of C for this
potential bias, we will attempt to match the term given by eq. (5) by estimating
the dierential in wage growth in the pre-transition periods, i.e. by
E( lnwit k j Cjt =  1;xit;zjt)  E( lnwit k j Cjt = 0;xit;zjt) (6)
Subtracting this expression from the (biased) dierence-in-dierence estimator
for C will consistently identify C ; provided a similar macro-trend has occurred over
the interval t k 1 to t k. At this point, it is worth noting that our data restrictions
will not allow us to estimate the dierence in time trends by using information from
a longer pre-transition time interval, as most of our regime switchers cannot be
tracked over a longer time period prior to the observed transitions. Given that we
have to rely on wage growth in at most two pre-transition years (i.e. k = 2) , the
7A further assumption is conditional mean independence of Cjt and "it:
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question of whether the dierential in wage growth reects a dierence in long-term
trends or a mere anticipation eect is crucial to the correction of the bias as given by
eq. (5). A dierence in pre-transition wage growth in the sense of an Ashenfelter's
dip (Blundell and Costa Dias 2002) would imply that the bias as given by eq. (5)
should basically reverse its sign. However, the discussion in Section 2 has shown that
the institutional impediments to changing contract status render such anticipation
eects very unlikely. This is particularly true for those regime changes from existing
contracts that are associated with lower wages in the pre-transition periods. The
reason is that any regime switch that involves leaving an existing contract may be
expected to come into eect after a certain time lag after the transition has taken
place. For existing contracts, this implies that negative dierences in pre-transition
wage growth are dicult to reconcile with anticipation eects.8
3.2 Data and Variable Description
In the empirical analysis we use data from the IAB Linked Employer-Employee
panel (LIAB) which combines data from the IAB-Establishment Panel and the Em-
ployment Statistics Register. The IAB-Establishment Panel is based on an annual
survey of establishments in western Germany administered since 1993 by the re-
search institute of the Federal Employment Services in Nuremberg. Establishments
in eastern Germany entered the panel in 1996. The database is a representative
sample of German establishments employing at least one employee who pays social
security contributions. The survey collects a great deal of information on establish-
ment structure and performance (see e.g. Bellmann et al. 2002).
The construction of the linked employer-employee data set occurs in two steps:
First, we select establishments from the establishment panel data set. From the
8Note, however, that this argument does not apply to positive dierences in pre-transition wage
growth as rms are generally free to pay higher wages than those stipulated in the wage contract.
In this case, we will evaluate the likelihood of a mere anticipation eect by looking at whether the
dierence in wage growth during the transition period reverses its sign. Such a development would
argue against anticipation eects as the latter are likely to cause the observed larger pre-transition
wage growth to be continued.
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available waves 1993 to 2008, we use the years 1995 to 2008, since detailed informa-
tion on bargaining coverage is available only from 1995 onwards. Since information
on a number of variables, such as investment expenditures and sales are gathered
retrospectively for the preceding year, we lose information on the last year. In order
to be able to conduct rst-dierencing, only establishments with consistent infor-
mation on the variables of interest (described below) and at least two consecutive
time-series observations are included in our sample. Moreover, we restrict our sam-
ple to establishments from the western German mining and manufacturing sector
with at least two employees. We focus on these sectors for two reasons: First, unions
are generally believed to be particularly strong in this part of the economy (Has-
sel 1999, Addison et al. 2007) and second, former studies have already established
signicant wage premiums associated with collective bargaining contracts in these
sectors (Stephan and Gerlach 2005). We conne our analysis to western Germany
as we argue that the endogeneity problem is likely to be somewhat smaller than in
eastern Germany. The reason is that in western Germany unionisation is likely to
be more exogenous, since it presumably reects to a larger extent the result of a his-
torically grown industrial relations structure as compared with eastern Germany.9
Overall, this sample selection results in a sample of 1,724 establishments with 7,589
observations, yielding an unbalanced panel containing establishment observations
with, on average, 4.4 years of data.
As to collective bargaining coverage, establishments are asked to report whether
they are bound to a centralised industry-wide collective wage agreement (C) or,
alternatively, to a rm-specic wage agreement (F ). Moreover, since 1999 establish-
ments without any binding collective contract (N) are asked whether they follow
informally the terms of an industry-wide agreement. However, for the available
waves respondents are not asked to provide any information on the precise nature
of the voluntarily applied contract terms. As a result, the informational content of
9After German unication the western German system of collective bargaining had been set
up quite immediately by western unions in eastern Germany. The decline in membership rates in
eastern Germany then arose primarily from a rapid wage convergence between western and eastern
Germany which unions succeeded to achieve following German unication (Hunt 2001).
11
this question remains rather elusive. Throughout the following analysis, collective
bargaining status therefore refers to the existence of a legally binding agreement,
i.e. establishments informally following the terms of an industry agreement will be
treated as being uncovered. As a consequence, our estimated wage premiums need
to be interpreted as wage mark-ups associated with a legally binding collective wage
agreement.
To avoid measuring spurious changes in contract status, we exploit the fact
that employers face two legal impediments to leaving wage bargaining as set out in
Section 2: The rst one relates to the validity time limit according to which the
contract terms continue to apply until the respective contract has expired, whereas
the second one is due to the fact that employers are obliged to replace the contract
terms by individual contracts in order to be able to depart from previous contractual
arrangements. It is reasonable to believe that such a replacement will take place
after a certain time lag and is likely to occur only if non-coverage is maintained for
a sucient amount of time. For this reason, we argue that employers who report
a change from industry/rm-level coverage to no coverage and then an immediate
change to either industry or rm-level coverage are very unlikely to have replaced
the original contract terms by individual contracts. As a consequence, we impute
all reported FNF and CNC sequences by FFF and CCC sequences, respectively.
In our sample this aects 9 and 54 out of 1,724 establishments. In a similar vein,
FNC and CNF sequences are substituted by FFC and CCF , which aects 15 and
7 establishments, respectively. Moreover, for those plants with at least 4 time-series
observations, who report the same regime for all time periods but one, we further
impute the reported outlier-regime by the remaining regimes - in our sample this
aects 50 establishments. From the remaining establishments, we exclude those that
change their collective bargaining status more than once in the time-period under
consideration. This aects 82 out of 335 establishments that still exhibit a variation
in contract status. In section 3.3.5, we will conduct some robustness checks with
respect to this exclusion and our adopted imputation procedure.
12
In the second step, we merge the establishment data with individual-level in-
formation. The worker information comes from the Employment Statistics Register,
which is an administrative panel data set based on notications which employers are
obliged to provide for each employee covered by the German social security system
(see e.g. Bender et al. 2000). We merge the establishment data with notications for
all employees who are employed by the selected establishments on June 30th of each
year. From the worker data we drop observations for apprentices, part time workers
and homeworkers.10 To avoid modeling human capital formation and retirement
decisions, we exclude individuals younger than 19 and older than 55. Moreover,
since we consider only full-time workers, we eliminate those workers whose wages
fall short of some threshold level.11 Due to the very low proportion of movers, we
exclude those individuals who move between sample establishments during the time
period of consideration. Again, we consider only those individuals for whom at least
two consecutive time-series observations are available. The nal sample comprises
629,635 individuals in 1,613 establishments, yielding an unbalanced panel contain-
ing 2,714,750 individual observations with, on average, 4.3 years of data for each
worker.12
The individual data include information on the gross daily wage, age, gender,
nationality, employment status (blue/white-collar), educational status (three cate-
gories)13 and on individual tenure, which has been adjusted for employment inter-
ruptions at the same employer. The dependent variable in the subsequent analysis
is the real gross daily wage, which is reported inclusive of fringe-benets as long
as such wage supplements are subject to social security contributions. Since there
is an upper contribution limit to the social security system, gross daily wages are
10Part time workers are excluded because the Employment Statistics Register lacks explicit
information on hours worked.
11The threshold is dened as the twice amount of the lower social security contribution limit.
12Note that we lose some further establishments due to the exclusion of movers and those worker-
rm combinations with less than two consecutive time-series observations.
13The categories are: Low-skilled (no vocational degree), medium-skilled (completed vocational
degree), high-skilled (technical college degree or university degree). Missing and inconsistent data
on education are corrected according to the imputation procedure described in Fitzenberger et al.
(2006). This procedure relies, roughly speaking, on the assumption that individuals cannot lose
their educational degrees.
13
top-coded. In our sample, top-coding aects about 15 per cent of all observations.
To address this problem, we construct 52 cells based on two education categories14,
gender and year. For each cell, a Tobit regression is estimated with log daily wages as
the dependent variable and individual and establishment covariates as explanatory
variables. As described in Gartner (2005), right-censored observations are replaced
by wages randomly drawn from a truncated normal distribution whose moments are
constructed by the predicted values from the Tobit regressions and whose (lower)
truncation point is given by the contribution limit to the social security system.
After this imputation procedure, nominal wages are deated by the Consumer Price
Index of the Federal Statistical Oce Germany normalised to 1 in 2000.
Turning to the establishment variables, we control for establishment size, per-
capita value added, the capital-labour ratio, the existence of a works council as well
as collective bargaining coverage.15 Table 1 reports (non-weighted) sample statistics
for individuals subject to an industry-level contract, a rm-level contract and for
those without any bargaining coverage. The gures reveal that rm-level contracts
are associated with the largest raw wage dierential and the lowest variability in
wages. The sample means for the establishment variables show that workers subject
to rm-level agreements are, on average, employed by larger, more capital-intensive
and more productive rms, followed by those covered by an industry-wide agreement.
Note that the results with respect to rm size are in line with what has been found
earlier in the literature (e.g. Schnabel et al. 2006).
14The two categories are: Low-skilled and medium/high-skilled.
15A more detailed description of the construction of the establishment variables can be found in






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As to the individual characteristics, workers under rm and industry-specic
contracts are, on average, more likely to be male, are less likely to have no voca-
tional degree and have more months of tenure relative to uncovered individuals. As
a result, most of the dierences in observed establishment and individual character-
istics would generally predict higher wages for workers in covered establishments,
which clearly requires a multivariate estimation strategy.
Table 2: Regression results
OLS Plant xed eects Spell xed eects
Region
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coe. SE Coe. SE Coe. SE
INDUSTRY-LEVEL 0.060 (0.010) 0.006 (0.005) 0.004 (0.003)
FIRM-LEVEL 0.055 (0.018) -.010 (0.008) -.008 (0.006)
FEMALE -.203 (0.008) -.188 (0.008) | |
AGE 0.022 (0.001) 0.022 (0.001) 0.033 (0.008)
AGE2 -.000 (0.000) -.000 (0.000) -.000 (0.000)
TENURE/10 0.007 (0.001) 0.008 (0.001) 0.017 (0.006)
(TENURE/10)2 -.000 (0.000) -.000 (0.000) -.000 (0.000)
FOREIGN 0.003 (0.006) -.008 (0.005) | |
WHITECOLLa) 0.293 (0.006) 0.282 (0.006) 0.053 (0.010)
MEDIUM-SKILLEDb) 0.076 (0.004) 0.068 (0.003) 0.063 (0.009)
HIGH-SKILLED 0.243 (0.010) 0.234 (0.007) 0.116 (0.017)
log(SIZE) 0.028 (0.004) 0.018 (0.011) 0.030 (0.013)
VALUE-ADDED 0.033 (0.006) 0.010 (0.004) -.001 (0.006)
WCOUNCIL 0.060 (0.013) 0.009 (0.006) 0.014 (0.007)
K/L 0.062 (0.002) 0.002 (0.000) 0.001 (0.002)
Source: LIAB 1995-2007. 1,613 establishments, 629,635 individuals, 2,714,750 (spell
dierenced: 2,063,951) observations. Note: The dependent variable is the individual log
real daily wage. Standard errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the
establishment level. Model (1) includes 10 regional dummies and 16 industry dummies,
model (3) includes no constant. All models include time dummies. a) Reference: Blue collar,
b) Reference: Low-skilled. Signicant at 1%-level, 5%-level, 10%-level.
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3.3 Results
3.3.1 Pooled OLS Results
From the descriptive statistics in Table 1 it can be seen that the raw wage dieren-
tial amounts to about 20 log points under industry contracts and to 29 log points
under rm-level contracts. Column (1) in Table 2 shows the results from estimat-
ing a pooled OLS (POLS) regressions controlling for a full set of individual and
establishment characteristics. The gures show that with some minor exceptions all
individual and establishment covariates enter the specications with their expected
sign and are signicant at the 1%-level.16 The estimates in Column (1) indicate
that the wage premiums of both industry and rm-level contracts drop by about 70
and 80 per cent, respectively, once dierences in individual and establishment char-
acteristics are controlled for. Overall, the (unreported) results from stepwise POLS
regressions indicate that observable establishment characteristics, such as dierences
in establishment size, per-capita value added and the capital-labour ratio, account
for the largest proportion of omitted variable bias in the raw wage dierentials.
3.3.2 Unobserved Establishment Heterogeneity
Given that establishment characteristics explain the largest proportion of the raw
wage dierentials, we next control for establishment xed eects to assess the ex-
tent to which sorting of unobservably better employers into the regimes aects our
estimates. With an establishment xed eects specication, the wage premiums
associated with rm and industry-level contracts are identied solely from within-
establishment variation in contract status. To gain an idea about the underlying
dynamics with respect to collective bargaining status, Table 3 reports the num-
ber of observed transitions between the three regimes.17 Closer inspection of the
16In particular, establishment size, per-capita value added and the capital-labour ratio are found
to be positively related to wages, a result which is consistent with what has been found earlier in
the literature. For rm size eects see e.g. Oi and Idson (1999), German evidence on employer
size eects is provided by Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991). Hildreth and Oswald (1997) and Arai
(2003) present international evidence on the wage-prot relationship, while evidence for Germany
is documented in Hubler and Konig (1998) and Guertzgen (2009).
17The number of individuals aected by each transition is reported in Table 5.
17
o-diagonal entries in Table 3 shows that 253 out of 1,613 establishments (15.7
per cent) changed contract status between 1995 and 2007, with the biggest move-
ment taking place between no-coverage and industry-level contracts. In addition,
the gures indicate that the number of establishments becoming uncovered (119
\quitters") if found to exceed the number of establishments becoming covered (72
\joiners"). Column (2) in Table 2 shows the results from estimating a establishment
xed eects specication.18 While the coecients on the individual covariates are
quite similar to those from the OLS specications, the coecients on the plant-
level variables decline substantially for the majority of covariates. The coecient
on industry-level contracts becomes very small and insignicant, whereas the wage
premium under rm-level contract is even negative. Overall, these ndings indicate
that the wage premiums essentially vanish once the non-random selection of rms
into the bargaining regimes is accounted for. Note, however, that the establishment
xed eect may also reect a positive selection on behalf of workers as long as j
reects a time-constant unobservably better workforce composition.
Table 3: Changes in contract status
Transitions
from to: Industry-level Firm-level No-coverage
Industry-level 920 37 100 1,057 (65.5%)
Firm-level 25 77 19 121 (7.5%)
No-coverage 62 10 363 435 (27.0%)
1,007 (62.4%) 124 (7.7%) 482 (29.9%) 1,613
Source: LIAB 1995-2007. The gures refer to the number of establishments.
3.3.3 Unobserved Individual and Establishment Heterogeneity
The estimated wage mark-ups might still be biased if a within-establishment varia-
tion of contract status were correlated with a change in the composition of workers'
unobservable skills. To address this further source of bias, we next control for both
individual and establishment-specic unobservables, i and j; by estimating a spell
18To avoid including 1,612 additional dummy variables, all variables are transformed by sub-
tracting averages at the establishment level.
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dierenced specication. Note that identication of both i and j is driven by indi-
viduals who move between establishments within our sample. In the extreme case of
no turnover between sample establishments, spell and individual xed-eects yield
the same results, and i and j cannot be separately identied. A closer examina-
tion of the distribution of the number of spells shows that the majority of individuals
do not move between sample establishments - only 0.9 per cent of all workers in the
original sample move from one sample establishment to another.19 Moreover, out of
615 establishments with sample movers, 433 (about 70 per cent) employ less than
5 movers (out of which 221 have only one single mover). We therefore excluded
movers from our sample and do not separately identify i and j as proposed by
Abowd et al. (1999), since for a large number of rms such an identication would
have to rely on a very small number of movers to estimate the establishment eect.20
Column (3) of Table 2 reports the results from the spell xed eects specications.
Since rst dierencing involves the loss of at least one wave for each worker, the
number of observations drops to 2,063,951.21 The gures show that spell dierenc-
ing does not alter the estimates of the wage premiums substantially. Overall, these
results suggest that establishments changing contract status do not experience a
simultaneous change in the unobservable skill composition of their workforce. Note
that this contrasts with other establishment covariates, such as value added and the
capital-labour ratio, whose coecients are estimated to be smaller once changes in
the composition of workers' unobservable skills are accounted for.
As mentioned earlier, much of the empirical research on union wage eects sug-
19The low proportion of movers is due to the fact that the linked employer-employee data set is
based on a sample of establishments. As a result, the probability of observing workers moving from
one sample establishment to another is very low. It is important to note that the low proportion
of movers does not imply that our data set is restricted to very stable employment relationships as
workers (and rms) may enter and exit the panel.
20The descriptive statistics of the spell dierenced variables are displayed in Table A2 in the
appendix. For the majority of covariates, the gures indicate a considerable dispersion of the
dierenced values over time. Exceptions are the skill dummies, where only a very small fraction of
workers experience a change in these variables. It is worth noting that these changes are unlikely
to reect pure measurement error, as we adopted an imputation procedure to correct misreporting
of the education variable (see Section 3.2).
21Note, however, that the resulting number of observations after spell dierencing is smaller
than the number of total individual observations minus the number of individuals, as the sample
includes workers with intermittent panel participation.
19
gests that unions do not only aect the mean but also the overall dispersion of wages
through their impact on the returns to worker and rm attributes. To assess the im-
Table 4: Interacted spell dierenced regression results




0.015 (0.006) -.003 (0.015)
Variable Returns to Individual Characteristics
(Interaction Effects)
FEMALE | | -.002 (0.003) 0.007 (0.005)
AGE 0.035 (0.008) 0.000 (0.001) -.001 (0.002)
AGE2 -.000 (0.000) -.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
TENURE/10 0.010 (0.000) 0.002 (0.000) 0.002 (0.001)
(TENURE/10)2 -.000 (0.000) -.000 (0.000) -.000 (0.000)
FOREIGN | | -.008 (0.006) -.008 (0.007)
WHITECOLL 0.054 (0.009) -.000 (0.004) -.009 (0.008)
MEDIUM-SKILLED 0.045 (0.010) 0.003 (0.004) 0.026 (0.008)
HIGH-SKILLED 0.093 (0.019) 0.007 (0.006) 0.036 (0.011)
Returns to Establishment Characteristics
(Interaction Effects)
log(SIZE) 0.024 (0.010) 0.004 (0.003) 0.001 (0.008)
VALUE ADDED 0.009 (0.001) -.005 (0.005) -.005 (0.002)
WCOUNCIL 0.012 (0.006) 0.002 (0.006) 0.012 (0.011)
K/L -.000 (0.000) 0.004 (0.003) 0.000 (0.000)
Source: LIAB 1995-2007. 1,613 establishments, 629,635 individuals, 2,063,951 observations.
Note: The dependent variable is the spell dierenced individual log real daily wage. Standard
errors are in parentheses and are adjusted for clustering at the establishment level. The model
includes no constant and 11 time dummies.
Signicant at 1%-level, 5%-level, 10%-level.
pact of collective bargaining coverage on the overall wage structure, Table 4 reports
the estimates of a fully interacted spell dierenced specication, which includes in-
teraction terms of all covariates with the contract status dummies. The average
wage premiums for rm and industry-level contracts are presented in the rst row
of Columns (2) and (3), respectively, whereas the interaction eects of individual
and establishment level observables are shown below. Recall that the interacted
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regressors are expressed in terms of deviations from their sample means, so that
the estimated coecient on rm and industry-level contracts is to be interpreted as
the wage premium for a worker with the average characteristics of the sample. The
results from the interacted spell dierenced regressions imply a wage mark-up of
about 0.015 under industry-level contracts, which is statistically signicant. The es-
timated wage premium under rm-level contracts is close to zero (-0.003) and is very
imprecisely estimated. Groupwise F -tests testing the joint signicance of the inter-
action coecients for industry and rm-level contracts reject the null-hypothesis
of the equality of all the coecients across the three regimes (with p-values below
0.001).
The estimated interaction eects in Table 4 show that the estimated returns to
most of the individual attributes are not signicantly smaller for covered individuals.
The returns to tenure are larger under both rm and industry level contracts. More-
over, rm-level contracts are found to signicantly increase the returns to medium
and high-skilled qualications. Note that these ndings stand in contrast to what is
typically obtained by a simple interacted POLS regression, suggesting that collec-
tive contracts reduce the returns to observable worker attributes.22 This pattern of
results is consistent with the notion that the typical attening of the wage structure
that emerges from a simple POLS specication arises from a selectivity bias, since
workers with low levels of observed skills tend to be positively selected and workers
with higher levels of observed skills tend to be negatively selected into covered rms.
To highlight this selection process, it may be instructive to compare, for example,
the rm-level wage premium among workers without any vocational degree to the
premium among high-skilled workers (with a technical college or university degree).
For the latter, the wage premium resulting from an (unreported) interacted POLS
specication is -4.7 log points and increases to 1 log points in the spell dierenced
specication. By comparison, for a worker without any degree the interacted POLS
22The results from an (unreported) fully interacted POLS specication indicate that the esti-
mated returns to most of the individual attributes such as age, gender, tenure and a medium
and high-skilled qualication are smaller for covered individuals. The established attening of the
wage structure is similar to what has been found in the international literature and conrms recent
ndings by Stephan and Gerlach (2005) for Germany.
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specication implies a positive wage premium of 3.5 log points, which drops to about
-2.6 log points once the selection into the regimes is accounted for. As a result, the es-
timates of the equalising eect of rm-level contracts on low-skilled workers from the
POLS specication considerably overstate the true equalising eect and may even
reverse the premiums across skills. As to the returns to establishment attributes,
the estimates show that the returns to plant size are larger under industry-level con-
tracts, even though the coecient on the interaction term only borders signicance
(with a p-value of 0.12). Moreover, both rm and industry-level contracts are found
to decrease the returns to establishment productivity, even though the interaction
term under industry-level contracts is fairly imprecisely estimated.
3.3.4 Analysing Separate Transitions
Even though the spell dierenced specications conditioned on an important set
of establishment characteristics such as changes in establishment size, capital in-
tensity and productivity, a change in contract status might still be correlated with
time-specic unobservables. To assess the severity and direction of a potential en-
dogeneity bias, we now present the estimation results based on a trend-adjusted
dierence-in-dierence approach. To do so, we separately analyse transitions from
one regime to the other by contrasting the wage growth of individuals experienc-
ing a change in contract status to the wage growth of those individuals who are
employed by plants that stay in the origin regime. As set out in section 3.1, the
resulting estimator is adjusted for dierences in changes in time-specic shocks by
subtracting the dierential in wage growth in the pre-transition periods. Due to a
change in the survey question in 1998, the analysis of separate transitions will be
conned to the period 1999 to 2007.23 To gain further insights into potential sources
23For the transitions prior to 1999, an important concern is that a change in the survey question
between 1997 and 1998 might have induced an incorrect reporting of the existence of rm-level
contracts until 1998. Until 1998, the survey question concerning rm-level contracts was \In this
establishment, is there a rm-level contract in force?" and changed afterwards to \... is there
a rm-level contract in force that has been concluded between this establishment and a trade
union?" (author's translation). Arguably, this may have induced an incorrect reporting of rm-
level contracts particularly among those establishments who had concluded a plant-level agreement
with their works council.
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of dierent time-specic shocks, Table A3 in the appendix presents characteristics
of switching establishments compared with those in the reference groups. Closer
inspection of dierences in observable characteristics may give us some further in-
dication about the severity of a potential endogeneity bias as it seems reasonable
to assume that dierences in unobservable factors are likely to be correlated with
dierences in observables. In Table 5, each panel's rst row presents the estimates
of the wage premium of a particular transition. The third column contains the esti-
mated wage premium in the transition period t. This wage premium is based on the
pooled estimation of eq. (4) on the subsample of plants that experience a change
in contract status in t (\regime switchers") and those plants that always adopt the
origin regime (\stable plants"). For those employers and workers for whom sucient
time-series observations are available, the remaining columns contain the estimated
dierences in wage growth between regime switchers and stable plants in the pre
and post-transition years t  1; t  2; t+ 1 and t+ 2, respectively. These estimates
are again based on the pooled estimations of eq. (4) for the respective time peri-
ods on the subsample of regime switchers and stable plants.24 Finally, each panel's
second (third) row presents the trend-adjusted wage premiums which result from
the dierences between the estimated wage premiums in t; t + 1 and t + 2 and the
pre-transition dierentials in wage growth in t  1 (t  2).
Turning rst to the transitions from industry to rm-level contracts, Table 5
reports a signicantly negative wage premium of -3.1 log points in period t. The
wage premium in t + 1 is of similar magnitude. The estimated dierence in pre-
transition wage growth in t 1 is found to be positive and signicant, indicating that
wages for these regime changers did rise relatively stronger prior to the transition
year.25 With respect to the pre-transition dierentials in wage growth in t  1, this
24This amounts to estimating eq. (4) including the respective lags and leads of a dummy variable
that indicates the change in contract status in t. To estimate the pre and post-transition wage
growth dierentials, we include all individuals in the respective time periods, i.e. also those who
are not employed by the regime switchers in period t. We further exclude from these individuals
those who are also subject to a change in contract status in t 1; t 2; t+1 and t+2, respectively.
25Note that the discussion in Section 3.1 has shown that positive dierences in pre-transition
wage growth may not rule out mere anticipation eects as rms are generally free to pay higher
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Table 5: Analysis of separate transitions
Average wage gain (loss) compared with workers in plants that always adopt the origin regime:
Transition
Period:a) t  2 t  1 t t+ 1 t+ 2







(2) Dierence to t  1 { { -.053 -.060 -.013







(2) Dierence to t  1 { { -.025 0.000 -.009
(3) Dierence to t  2 { { 0.073 0.098 0.089
(N=3,599, J=20)




(2) Dierence to t  1 { { 0.007 -.019 -.014
(3) Dierence to t  2 { { 0.014 -.012 -.007
(N=5,277, J=98)
(1) No-Cov./Industry 0.007 -.006 0.014 0.011 -.001
(2) Dierence to t  1 { { 0.020 0.017 0.005
(3) Dierence to t  2 { { 0.007 0.004 -.008
(N=2,586, J=55)
(1) Firm/No-Cov. 0.019 0.004 0.012 -.015 -.009
(2) Dierence to t  1 { { 0.008 -.019 -.013
(3) Dierence to t  2 { { -.007 -.034 -.028
(N=1,528, J=14)






(2) Dierence to t  1 { { 0.030 0.028 0.031
(3) Dierence to t  2 { { 0.019 0.017 0.020
(N=669, J=9)
Source: LIAB 1999-2007. The estimates of the wage premiums are obtained by estimating
the interacted spell dierenced specication using the respective subsamples of establishments
(those that experience the change in contract status and those that retain the origin regime).
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the establishment-level. J refers to the number
of establishments and N refers to the number of individuals experiencing the transitions.
a) t refers to the year of the transition. A transition in year t is dened as a change in contract








gives rise to signicantly negative wage premiums of rm-level contracts in t and
t+ 1.
In the next panel, the estimate for the wage premium in t indicates that in-
dividuals subject to a change from rm to industry-level contracts experience no
signicant wage change relative to those individuals in stable plants. This contrasts
with the wage premiums for the subsequent time periods t+ 1 and t+ 2; which are
estimated to be positive. However, the descriptive statistics in Panel C in Table
A3 in the appendix indicate that these estimates might still be downward biased,
as establishments joining industry-level contracts are considerably smaller and less
capital-intensive than those that are always covered by rm-level contracts. While
the notion that \joiners" of industry-level contracts might have experienced dier-
ent time-specic shocks is not supported by the dierences in pre-transition wage
growth in t 1; it is conrmed by the signicantly negative dierence in wage growth
in t 2. This gives rise to trend-adjusted positive estimates for C ; whose coecients
are found to be highly signicant in period t; t+ 1 and t+ 2.
The next panel in Table 5 shows the results for the transitions from industry-
level bargaining to no-coverage. The estimate for the wage premium in t indicates
that individuals in leaving plants experience no immediate signicant wage change
relative to those individuals who are always covered by industry-level contracts.
However, workers in leaving plants incur a signicant relative wage loss one and two
years after the transition, indicating that wage adjustments after contract status
change may take some time (see the estimates for t + 1 and t + 2). As set out in
section 3.1, for establishments leaving industry-level contracts one might expect a
downward biased estimate of the overall wage premium (corresponding to an upward
bias of the industry-level contract wage premium relative to uncovered plants). The
underlying notion is that the decision to leave industry-level bargaining is likely
to be correlated with negative shocks. The estimates in row (2) indicate that this
wages than those stipulated in the wage contract. However, our results for the industry to rm-
level transitions show that the larger pre-transition wage growth among the regime switchers is not
found to continue in the transition period and is therefore unlikely to reect anticipation eects.
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expectation is borne out by the estimates, as the negative wage premiums become
smaller and insignicant once negative pre-transition dierences in wage growth are
accounted for. Note that the evidence of a downward biased estimate is further
conrmed by dierences in observables in Panel B in Table A3. The gures show
that leaving plants dier considerably in rm size, productivity and capital intensity
from stable plants, with all dierences being statistically signicant.
Analysing the transitions from no-coverage to industry-level contracts, the es-
timates for the transition period t indicate that individuals joining industry-level
contracts experience a positive wage mark-up of the magnitude of 1.4 log points
(bordering signicance with a p-value of 0.11). The fact that joining industry-level
contracts from no-coverage as well as from rm-level contracts may entail a positive
wage mark-up raises the question why employers join industry-level bargaining if
doing so is voluntary in Germany. One possible explanation relates to the poten-
tial of workers to present employers with a credible threat to strike. Unfortunately,
the dierences in observables shown in Panels A and C in Table A3 do not give a
clue regarding these potential explanations: Neither do switching employers have
a larger fraction of works councils than stable plants nor do they exhibit any sys-
tematic dierences in the workforce composition which might help explain a larger
propensity of union organisation. The only dierences that stand out are that
establishments joining industry-level contracts have a somewhat larger fraction of
blue-collar workers than those always staying uncovered. An alternative explanation
might be that the decision to join industry-level contracts is driven by others factors.
For instance, employers might favour industry-level contracts as standardised wage
agreements save transaction costs that typically arise when stipulating individual or
rm-specic contracts.
The transitions from rm-level contracts to no-coverage show that workers in
leaving plants experience a relative wage loss of 1.5 and 0.9 log points one and two
years after the transition. However, these wage premiums are very imprecisely es-
timated. Even though workers in leaving plants tend to experience a larger wage
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growth prior to the transitions, the negative trend-adjusted wage premiums are
also insignicant. Turning next to employers joining rm-level contracts from no-
coverage, the estimates clearly indicate that workers in joining plants incur positive
and signicant wage premiums that last for at least two further years. Even though
the dierences in observables in Panel A in Table A3 show that joining plants ap-
pear to be larger and more capital intensive than those always staying uncovered,
the insignicant dierences in pre-transition wage growth across regime switchers
and stable plants do not provide evidence of a potential endogeneity bias. The de-
scriptives further suggest that joining plants have signicantly more often a works
council than those always staying uncovered. This indicates that, other than for
industry-level contracts, works councils might be an import means to enforce rm-
level contracts. Note that this nding is consistent with rm-level contracts being
strongly determined by rm-specic union organisation, as a large majority of works
councilors are generally recruited from union members. Overall, however, we wish
to note that these estimates are to be interpreted with particular caution as they
are based on a very small number of establishments joining rm-level contracts.
Taken together, the analysis of separate transitions suggests that the insigni-
cant wage premiums of rm-level contracts that have been obtained from the pooled
spell dierenced regressions mask substantial heterogeneity across the dierent tran-
sitions. While joining rm-level bargaining from no-coverage may well be associated
with a positive wage premium, the transitions between rm and industry-level con-
tracts tend to give rise to negative wage premiums of rm-level contracts. At this
point it is instructive to compare the industry to rm-level with the industry-level
to no-coverage transitions. The result that both transitions result in an immedi-
ate or lagged wage loss may be interpreted as evidence that these regime switches
appear to be initiated by employers. What determines whether employers leaving
industry-level bargaining switch to rm-level bargaining or completely withdraw
from bargaining? The trend-adjusted dierence-in-dierence estimates show that
the transitions to no-coverage are associated with less pre-transition wage growth,
whereas the transitions to rm-level contracts tend to be associated with larger
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pre-transition wage growth as compared with the reference group. These dierent
patterns of pre-transition wage growth suggest that unions succeed in maintaining
unionisation by rm-level contracts only in successful rms. This notion is further
supported by the dierences in observables in Panel B in Table A3, which suggest
that plants switching from industry to rm-level contracts are no less productive
than stable plants. The descriptives further support the view that local worker
representations might help maintain unionisation. The reason is that employers
switching to rm-level contracts have signicantly more frequently a works council
than those withdrawing from collective bargaining. Taken together, our ndings
argue against the view that the transition from industry to rm-level contracts is
initiated by unions in order to secure even higher wages as compared with those stip-
ulated in the respective industry-level agreements. The results rather suggest that
rm-level contracts are the only means left to maintain unionisation at employers
who otherwise would have become non-unionised.
3.3.5 Robustness Checks
In this section, we assess the sensitivity of our ndings with respect to our imputation
procedure. To do so, we reestimated the wage premiums associated with the separate
regime switches using the raw transitions. In the original sample, we observe 617
transitions as compared to 253 transitions reported in Table 3.26 Overall, the pattern
of results is similar to that in Table 5, even though the transitions between industry-
level contracts and no-coverage are estimated with less precision. Note that this is
consistent with the estimates being biased towards zero due to some employers
misreporting contract status changes. A major exception that stands out are the
transitions from no-coverage to rm-level contracts. Contrary to what has been
found earlier, the wage premium is negative in t and becomes signicantly positive
only with some time lag in t+1 and t+2. Thus, the positive wage premiums found
earlier appear to be particularly sensitive to the adopted imputation and exclusion of
26The results of the following robustness checks corresponding to those in Tables 5 can be found
inTable A4 and A5 in the Appendix.
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plants with many contract status changes. Note that the established negative wage
premium after including plants reporting several back and forth regime switches
suggests that the latter are likely to be particularly negatively selected.
4 Summary and Conclusions
Using a large linked employer-employee data set from western German manufactur-
ing, this paper has provided new evidence on collective bargaining wage premiums.
By using longitudinal data, we seek to improve on recent evidence which relies on
cross-sectional data to estimate the collective bargaining premium. Summing up,
our results indicate that between 70 and 80 per cent of the wage premium associated
with industry and rm-level contracts can be explained by dierences in observables.
Overall, the results suggest that dierences in rm characteristics account for the
largest proportion of omitted variable bias.
Taken together, the pooled dierenced specications suggest the following con-
clusions. First, dierences in observables and unobservables nearly explain the full
rm and industry-level contract wage premium. In failing to detect substantial wage
premiums relative to uncovered rms, our ndings seem to be in line with the re-
sults reported by Hartog et al. (2002), who nd no evidence of substantial industry
and rm-level contract wage premiums for the Netherlands. The authors interpret
this result as a consequence of the relatively corporatist Dutch wage determination
system. Note that a similar conclusion might apply to Germany, where centralised
unions are likely to internalise negative externalities resulting from their wage de-
mands. A further possible explanation might be that our identication strategy
cannot rule out the possibility that the small estimated wage premiums may be an
artefact of formal contract changes that are not paralleled by changes in actual wage
policies. For example, the small estimated wage mark-ups might be driven by the
fact that those establishments joining industry-level contracts already informally
followed the terms of such contracts (or, alternatively, that those who formally leave
industry-level bargaining continue to apply the contract terms). Particularly for
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the transitions that involve leaving industry-level contracts we are able to rule out
such an explanation. The results suggest that workers in rms leaving industry-
level bargaining may incur wage losses relative to those workers who are employed
by \stable" rms. However, adjusting the estimates for dierential time trends sup-
ports the notion that plants changing from industry-level contracts to no coverage
experience more negative time-specic shocks than stable plants, thereby conrming
the result that there is no \true" wage eect of leaving wage bargaining.
For rm-level contracts, the analysis of separate transitions suggests that the
overall insignicant wage premiums that have been obtained from the pooled dif-
ferenced regressions mask substantial heterogeneity across the dierent transitions.
The separate transitions indicate that joining rm-level bargaining from no-coverage
may well be associated with a positive wage premium, whereas the transitions be-
tween rm and industry-level contracts tend to give rise to negative wage premiums
of rm-level contracts. This nding is consistent with rm-level bargaining being
initiated by employers who were formerly covered by an industry-level contract and
argues against the view that unions tend to enforce such contracts in order to secure
above average wage gains in highly successful rms.
Finally, there are several potential directions for future research. First, we have
focused on the association between a change in contract status and wages. Future
research should address the question as to how other outcomes such as employment
and investment decisions are aected by collective bargaining coverage. Second,
our analysis was conned to two years after the change in contract status. As the
legal impediments to a change in contract status suggest that wage adjustments
may take some time, further investigations should go into the long-run eects in
order to explore whether there are further dynamics in the response of wages. This
requires the availability of a considerably longer panel data set, which would allow
a suciently large number of establishments changing contract status to be tracked
over a longer time period.
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Establishment Number of employees reported for the month June averaged
size: over the present and preceding year.
Per-capita Value added is constructed by subtracting material costs from annual sales.
value added Per capita values are obtained by dividing value added by establishment
size. Nominal values are deated by a sector-specic (two-digit)
producer price index.
Capital-labour Constructed by using the perpetual inventory method starting from the
ratio capital value in the rst observation year and using the information on
expansion investments. The initial capital value is proxied by dividing
investment expenditures in each establishment's rst observation year
by a pre-period growth rate of investment, g; and a depreciation rate
of capital, d: Capital-stocks in subsequent periods are calculated by
adding real expansion investment expenditures.1) Nominal investment
expenditures are deated by the producer price index of investment goods
of the Federal Statistical Oce Germany. The capital-labour ratio is con-
structed by dividing the resulting capital proxy by establishment size.
Works council Dummy=1 if works council is present. In some waves (1995 and 1997)
only those plants that enter the panel are asked to report the existence
of a works council. For the remaining establishments the missing
information is imputed based upon the information in the following year.
Firm-level Dummy=1 if establishment is covered by a rm-specic agreement.
Industry-level Dummy=1 if establishment is covered by an industry-specic agreement.





LOG (WAGE) 0.017 0.071






VALUE ADDED 0.016 0.297






Source: LIAB 1995-2007. All dierences are averaged
over individuals. Changes in per-capita value added and
the capital-labour ratio are measured in 100,000 e.
a)For categorical variables, mean values refer to a dummy
variable indicating whether an individual experiences a
change in the respective variable.
Table A2: Summary statistics dierences
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Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev.
Transition to No-coverage Industry-level Firm-level contract
from
A. No-coverage (J=357) (J=55) (J=9)
LOG WAGE 4.39 0.26 4.37 0.25 4.48 0.19
FEMALE 0.28 0.24 0.20 0.21 0.13 0.14
AGE 39.30 3.99 38.02 4.74 40.15 3.54
TENURE 98.05 43.28 103.74 43.62 120.61 35.01
FOREIGN 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.17 0.06 0.06
WHITECOLL 0.36 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.49 0.38
LOW-SKILLED 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.05 0.05
MEDIUM-SKILLED 0.75 0.23 0.74 0.27 0.92 0.09
HIGH-SKILLED 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.04
VALUE ADDED 0.61 0.48 0.64 0.59 0.46 0.27
SIZE 113.73 192.45 71.84 166.83 132.09 1216.14
WCOUNCIL 0.29 0.44 0.18 0.34 0.50 0.5
K/L 0.56 0.78 0.83 3.02 0.46 0.27
B. Industry-level (J=98) (J=817) (J=33)
LOG WAGE 4.39 0.29 4.57 0.24 4.58 0.25
FEMALE 0.26 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20
AGE 39.59 4.01 40.04 2.93 40.68 2.35
TENURE 115.81 47.61 122.31 49.07 115.12 41.29
FOREIGN 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.08
WHITECOLL 0.34 0.26 0.36 0.23 0.37 0.23
LOW-SKILLED 0.15 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18
MEDIUM-SKILLED 0.81 0.22 0.74 0.19 0.75 0.17
HIGH-SKILLED 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.08
VALUE ADDED 0.53 0.32 0.76 0.55 0.80 0.43
SIZE 82.70 95.93 586.08 1,694.83 410.45 545.18
WCOUNCIL 0.32 0.45 0.77 0.41 0.94 0.24
K/L 0.55 1.59 0.96 2.14 0.68 0.72
... to be continued on next page
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... continued
Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev. Mean Std.-Dev.
Transition to No-coverage Industry-level Firm-level contract
from
C. Firm-level contract (J=14) (J=20) (J=68)
LOG WAGE 4.50 0.21 4.61 0.23 4.59 0.20
FEMALE 0.25 0.20 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.14
AGE 38.36 2.81 40.07 2.59 40.43 2.35
TENURE 100.90 40.73 129.21 59.24 123.21 51.40
FOREIGN 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.09
WHITECOLL 0.45 0.29 0.42 0.22 0.34 0.22
LOW-SKILLED 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.18 0.16
MEDIUM-SKILLED 0.82 0.16 0.77 0.19 0.75 0.15
HIGH-SKILLED 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.07
VALUE ADDED 0.65 0.30 0.83 0.64 0.80 0.44
SIZE 172.12 144.18 251.37 317.01 1,590.10 6,565.56
WCOUNCIL 0.63 0.50 0.82 0.39 0.97 0.17
K/L 0.75 0.77 0.59 0.76 1.40 2.80
Source: LIAB 1999-2007.
Note: Per-capita value added and the capital-labour ratio are measured in 100,000 e.
All variables are averaged over establishments.
Table A1: Summary statistics by transitions
Transitions
from to: Industry-level Firm-level No-coverage
Industry-level 882 90 194 1,166 (61.3%)
Firm-level 84 68 50 202 (10.6%)
No-coverage 152 47 334 533 (28.1%)
1,118 (58.8%) 205 (10.8%) 578 (30.4%) 1,901
Source: LIAB 1995-2007. The gures refer to the number of transitions.
The full original sample contains 1,695 establishments.
Table A4: Changes in contract status based on the raw transitions
37
Average wage gain (loss) compared with workers in plants that always adopt the origin regime:
Transition
Period:a) t  2 t  1 t t+ 1 t+ 2





(2) Dierence to t  1 { { -.021 -.034 0.001









(2) Dierence to t  1 { { 0.039 0.067 0.032




-.007 -.011 -.011 -.012

(2) Dierence to t  1 { { -.004 -.004 -.005
(3) Dierence to t  2 { { -.003 -.003 -.004
(N=13,719, J=184)
(1) No-Cov./Industry 0.005 0.000 0.000 -.004 0.012
(2) Dierence to t  1 { { 0.000 -.004 0.012




-.007 0.014 -.044 -.020
(2) Dierence to t  1 { { 0.021 -.037 -.013










(2) Dierence to t  1 { { -.016 0.022 0.012
(3) Dierence to t  2 { { -.043 -.005 -.015
(N=5,145, J=42)
Source: LIAB 1999-2007. The estimates of the wage premiums are obtained by estimating the inter-
acted spell dierenced specication using the respective subsamples of establishments (those that
experience the change in contract status and those that retain the origin regime). Standard errors are
adjusted for clustering at the establishment-level. J refers to the number of establishments and N
refers to the number of individuals experiencing the transitions. a) t refers to the year of the







Table A5: Analysis of separate transitions using the raw transitions
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